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Abstract 
In Bernard StieglerÕs Automatic Society Volume 1: The Future of Work Ôthe impossibleÕ and Ôthe 
improbableÕ appear as explicit parts of his political project. In his philosophy of technology, the 
impossible highlights the structural incompleteness that technics imparts to human existence. This 
article will trace how Stiegler draws on the work of Maurice Blanchot to produce this conjunction 
between technics and indetermination, and explore its political ramifications. This will show that 
rather than being a recent aspect of StieglerÕs work, the political use of the impossible brings 
BlanchotÕs subterranean influence to the fore. After briefly reconstructing BlanchotÕs understanding 
of language, impersonality, and writing, it will be shown that Stiegler shifts BlanchotÕs emphasis from 
the impossible to technical practices of the improbable. Stiegler follows an anthropological line where 
the experience of the impossible becomes a more general understanding of the experience of 
improbability through technical structures. StieglerÕs reading of Blanchot is central in his break with 
the place of the impossible in the politics of resistance advocated by post-structuralism, allowing him 
to support a politics of invention which makes space for the improbable within a large scale politics 
of technicity, rather than privileging indeterminacy itself. 
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In Bernard StieglerÕs recent Automatic Society Volume 1: The Future of Work the themes of Ôthe 
impossibleÕ and Ôthe improbableÕ appear as explicit parts of his political project (Stiegler, 2016). In 
his overarching philosophy of technology these terms highlight the political importance of the 
structural incompleteness that technics imparts to human existence. Humanity is without essence, 
defined only by the historical variations of the technical supplements that form its environment. The 
establishment of any political future that occurs within this process of anthropogenesis relies on 
acknowledging the impossibility of any final form of the human. In Automatic Society Stiegler draws 
explicitly on the work of Maurice Blanchot to develop the impossible and the improbable in order to 
produce a conjunction between technics, indetermination and politics. Rather than this being a 
development in StieglerÕs work, the political use of the concept of the impossible brings BlanchotÕs 
subterranean influence upon Stiegler to the fore. This article will trace the development of BlanchotÕs 
influence from its place in the Technics and Time series (Stiegler, 1998, 2009a, 2011a), to its political 
variation in StieglerÕs recent work. 
Until recently, the influence of Blanchot on Stiegler has gone relatively uncommented on in 
comparison to other, more pronounced influences on his work.
 
Other accounts of this relationship have 
either simply noted its presence (Vesco, 2015, pp.91, 102), or focused on the more general place of 
Blanchot within the Technics and Time series (Watt, 2016). Our focus will be on how Blanchot 
underpins StieglerÕs claim that the construction of a political future must make room for the impossible 
in the form of the improbable (Stiegler, 2016, p.243). This will be understood within the context of 
how BlanchotÕs understanding of writing influences StieglerÕs philosophy of technics. After briefly 
reconstructing BlanchotÕs understanding of language, impersonality, and writing, we will see how 
these terms influence core concepts in StieglerÕs philosophy; the default of origin, the co-constitution 
of the technical and the human, the dialogical relationship between the two, and that these relationships 
are possessed of two slopes, one towards homogeneity, and another towards transformation. In turn, 
we will see how Stiegler transforms BlanchotÕs work in two ways. First, along an anthropological line 
where the experience of the impossible through the practice of writing is transformed into a more 
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general understanding of the experience of indetermination through technical practices and rituals. 
Second, into a political understanding of the necessity of producing systemic conditions for such 
practices of the impossible, rather than privileging indeterminacy and singularity in themselves. In 
both of these transformations it will be shown that this is made possible by StieglerÕs shift of focus 
from the general condition of the impossible to the specific practices of the improbable. We will see 
how Stiegler uses this to form a politics of invention founded in large scale political structures that 
foster the improbable, differentiating him from the post-structuralist commitment to resistance 
through appeal to impossibility itself, a position that Blanchot is pivotal in establishing. 
BlanchotÕs influence on this trajectory in StieglerÕs project is not as pronounced as some of the more 
prominent and well discussed figures that he refers to. These includes Jacques Derrida (Colony, 2011; 
Roberts, 2005; Ross, 2013; Turner 2016), Andr Leroi-Gourhan (Johnson, 2013), Martin Heidegger 
(Colony, 2010), and Gilbert Simondon (Barthlmy, 2012). Instead, BlanchotÕs influence lurks 
beneath the surface, emerging at key moments to indicate to the reader the presence of a voice that for 
the most part does not speak, but rather orchestrates the other voices that Stiegler draws upon. Despite 
this hidden role, BlanchotÕs voice announces the beginning of Technics and Time in an epigraph to 
the general introduction which foregrounds the perspective on the impossible we will be addressing: 
Do you admit to this certainty: that we are at a turning point?  
-If it is a certainty, then it is not a turning point. The fact of being part of the moment in 
which an epochal change (if there is one) comes about also takes hold of the certain 
knowledge that would wish to determine this change, making certainty as inappropriate 
as uncertainty. We are never less able to circumvent ourselves than at such a moment: the 




This citation has been analysed from the perspective of the notion of the epoch it deploys (Watt, 2016, 
pp.306Ð308), and in the context of StieglerÕs understanding of the notion of real time (Wambacq & 
Buseyne, 2013, p.72). Two different themes will be pursued here. First, the periodic collapse of 
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certainty and uncertainty into something indeterminable or impossible, which Blanchot sees as one of 
the functions of writing and literature. Second, the necessity of this impossibility to the construction 
of a future, in that it reveals the possibility to transform, rather than merely naturalise, contingent 
technical systems. These two themes will lead us from the first volume of Technics & Time to the 
political adoption of impossibility in Automatic Society. Thus, while BlanchotÕs work underpins his 
own sense of politics (Blanchot, 1988; Hill, 2007; Hole, 2013; Iyer, 2004), of interest here how his 
philosophy of literature is transformed by Stiegler into a philosophy of technics, with its own political 
ramifications. We will, however, return to BlanchotÕs politics in order to show how these political 
ramifications form StieglerÕs shift of focus from the impossible to the improbable. 
Before embarking on tracing the transformation of the philosophy of literature found in Blanchot into 
a theory of technicity, it is worth briefly sketching both thinkerÕs political trajectories. It is widely 
acknowledged that BlanchotÕs politics were idiosyncratic. He began his career in the 1930s as a 
political journalist, editing and contributing to right-wing and nationalist publications, while criticising 
anti-Semitism and Nazism. During the war he joined the French resistance, and was later involved in 
the events of May 1968. These periods of activity are separated by little public intervention, and his 
writing is rarely explicitly political.
ii
 Regardless of this, across his various forms of involvement 
BlanchotÕs politics has been characterised by identifying the potential for resistance that the impossible 
provides (Bruns, 1997, p.33).  
Contrastingly, Stiegler has been constantly concerned with political questions, taking on the role of 
public intellectual in French political life. While his Technics and Time series, which details at length 
his philosophy of technology, only deals with politics obliquely, he has published several series of 
texts which deal with various issues pertaining to politics in the European and Anglo-American 
context. Most recently, Automatic Society attempts to come to terms with how increased automation 
is transforming both work and politics. Earlier texts include the two volumes of Symbolic Misery 
(Stiegler, 2014a, 2015a), which deal with the impact of aesthetic participation on politics, and the three 
volumes of Disbelief and Discredit (Stiegler, 2011b, 2013b, 2014b), which addresses the collapse of 
political belief into nihilism. StieglerÕs texts investigate, in varying ways, the impact that technics has 
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on political life, and he tries to invent concepts by which to ameliorate the negative impact of 
consumerism upon politics. StieglerÕs interventions are not solely textual, and his work as a founding 
member of the political group Ars Industrialis,
 iii
 director of the Institut de recherche et d'innovation 
at the Pompidou Centre, and his founding of a doctoral school dedicated to the notion of contributory 
research, all involve developing and promoting research that pursues the ideals that his writings 
develop. This leads to the key difference between Blanchot and Stiegler, based upon the shift of 
emphasis from the impossible to the improbable. Where Blanchot was concerned with resisting 
present conditions, Stiegler is actively involved in inventing new forms of practice. It will be 
concluded that this shift from resistance to invention characterises StieglerÕs attempt to separate 
himself from the political legacy of post-structuralism through his reading of Blanchot, by establishing 
the need for an inventive, rather than resistant, subject of politics.  
  
Language, the Impersonal and Writing 
The significance of this shift in emphasis can be shown by reconstructing how Blanchot characterizes 
language as an impersonal field that precedes the subject, and how literature or writing taps into the 
impossible and indeterminable character of this field. Language, for Blanchot, is the result of a 
negation of the thing which it represents:  
A word may give me its meaning, but first it suppresses it. For me to be able to say, ÔThis 
woman,Õ I must somehow take her flesh-and-blood reality away from her, cause her to be 
absent, annihilate her. The word gives me the being, but it gives it to me deprived of being. 
The word is the absence of that being, its nothingness, what is left of it when it has lost 
being-the very fact that it does not exist (Blanchot, 1995, p.322). 
Naming requires negation in order to present something in language, an abstraction from the thing. 
Blanchot does not see this as logical negation, but rather a more radical form of negativity which 
asserts the centrality of death within language. Negation is imbued with a creativity irreducible to 
dialectical sublation, more radical than negativity within a logical system, as it cannot be recuperated 
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by, or re-integrated into, language as a totality (Haase & Large, 2001, p.43). Expanding on the above 
citation, Blanchot continues:  
language does not kill anyone. But if this woman were not really capable of dying, if she 
were not threatened by death at every moment of her life, bound and joined to death by an 
essential bond, I would not be able to carry out that ideal negation, that deferred 
assassination which is what my language is (Blanchot, 1995, p.323). 
The possibility of death, an unsurpassable limit to which no understanding can be tethered, inhabits 
language in its very operation, preventing the enclosure of negation within totality (Blanchot, 1995, 
p.324). 
This force of negation is something the subject must inhabit. This forms two slopes of language. On 
the one hand, it is the very possibility of the subjectÕs existence, an impersonal field of concepts that 
make communication possible. Yet, this field is impersonal, because language is predicated upon 
death, which cannot be fully experienced or encapsulated by the activities of the subject: Ôour abstract 
language exerts upon us a constraint that separates us cruelly from ourselves Ð and yet we must answer 
for this abstractionÕ (Blanchot, 1993a, p.15). Escaping our grasp as a totality, language is nevertheless 
something which we must inhabit. Inhabiting language establishes a basis for communication, in which 
the subject that speaks attempts to cover over the negation at its heart:  
We untiringly construct the world in order that the hidden dissolution, the 
universal corruption that governs what ÔisÕ should be forgotten in favor of a clear 
and defined coherence of notions and objects, relations and forms (Blanchot, 1993a, p.33). 
Language attempts to erase or master the negation of the thing, a pre-requisite of any concept. This is 
never successful; the two slopes of language, communication through the concept and the negation 
upon which this premised, exist simultaneously (Blanchot, 1995, pp.330, 338). We are put into 
communication by a language that we inhabit, but that is never total, for it has negation at its heart 
(Bruns, 1997, pp.45Ð49). 
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The ability to tap into the negative side of this duality within language is what Blanchot affirms as 
writingÕs power. For Blanchot, writing Ôcomes from no recognizable source, is without author or 
origin, and therefore always refers to something more original than itselfÕ (Blanchot, 2000, p.10). This 
original reference point is the negation which forms the basis of communication, the medium through 
which writing operates. Language and writing are something which we inherit, in which we must 
speak through and exist within, but its origin is an impossibility that it cannot subsume or exhaust 
(Blanchot, 2003, p.205). Language refers to something that it cannot master, precisely because one 
speaks through negation (Blanchot, 1993a, p.35). This imparts to writing the possibility of affirming 
not merely communication, but the impossibility that underpins communication itself. Impossibility 
is not something exterior to language but an outside that is central to its functioning, yet irreducible to 
it: Ô"impossibility" Ð that which escapes, without there being any means of escaping it Ð would be 
not the privilege of some exceptional experience, but behind each oneÕ (Blanchot, 1993a, p.45). Within 
writing is the distinct potential for experiencing the impossible, something that is irreducible to any 
recuperation of negation by any dialectic or logical system. Also referred to as the neutral by Blanchot, 
this is something that is not just improbable, but irreducible to being itself (Blanchot, 1993a, p.76). 
There are, therefore, two forms of speech or writing, both supported by one and the same language: 
ÔOne is the speech of the universe, tending toward unity and helping to accomplish the whole; the 
other, the speech of writing, bears a relation of infinity and strangenessÕ (Blanchot, 1993a, p.78). This 
is where the impersonal finds its full significance. The writer, as subject, is formed in language, but as 
writer, they dissolve this subjectivity within the impersonality of this field, stepping outside of the role 
of language in constructing a world, moving towards the impossible (Blanchot, 1995, pp.315Ð317). 
Yet this impossibility can never be reached by the writer, but must be constantly approached by 
passing from language as communication to the negativity at its centre. Writing of the book, the work 
that is the product of writing and the basis of literature, Blanchot states: Ô[t]he book that collects the 
mind thus collects an extreme capacity for rupture, a limitless anxiety, one that the book cannot 
containÕ (Blanchot, 2003, pp.234Ð235). Writing reveals the impermanence of language by pushing its 
limits towards negativity. This work of writing is never finished, however, precisely because the 
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impossibility that it moves towards is not a full, plenary outside of language, but its very condition. 
As such, the negative cannot be encapsulated or reduced to language, but only approached through 
writing. 
Blanchot is indebted to Alexandre KojveÕs interpretation of Hegel for his translation of negativity 
into death as an absolute, unrecoverable negation, which can help clarify the importance of the 
impossible in relation to both negativity and possibility. In KojveÕs words, for Hegel, Ôconceptual 
understanding of empirical reality is equivalent to a murderÕ (Kojve, 1969, p.140). Negativity 
becomes tied to the annihilation, rather than dialectical progression, of the world and our 
understanding of it (Stoekl, 2006, p.42). This also characterises BlanchotÕs understanding of work, 
which he derives from The Phenomenology of Spirit (Blanchot, 1995, p.303). For Blanchot the literary 
work is the only mode through which the writer exists, but this work itself arises out of nothing 
(negativity), and does not exist until the writer begins writing. The passage Blanchot cites from Hegel 
to form this understanding is as follows:  
An individual cannot know what he [really] is until he has made himself a reality through 
action. However, this seems to imply that he cannot determine the End of his action until 
he has carried it out; but at the same time, since he is a conscious individual, he must have 
the action in front of him beforehand as entirely his own, i.e., as an End (Hegel, 1977, 
p.240) 
For Hegel this paradox marks a dialectical relation between the individual and their ends that is 
mediated by the negativity at the beginning of the act. Here, negativity is a condition of the possibility 
of individual ends. Blanchot radicalises this relation between negativity and possibility by attesting to 
the failure of this movement between negation and the possible, precisely because negation relies on 
something that cannot be incorporated into a logical system of possibility: the impossible. While the 
negative can be subsumed within the thought of the possible, the impossible is Ôa thought not allowing 
itself to be thought in the mode of appropriative comprehensionÕ (Blanchot, 1993a, p.43). 
Impossibility is not simply the improbable or that which negates the probable: it inhabits the negative 
in such a way that negation itself cannot be comprehended in full. This is precisely why the work does 
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not simply unfold an idea, but that this idea is made possible by the essential incompleteness that 
impossibility gives to it (Bruns, 1997, pp.40Ð42; Iyer, 2004, pp.35Ð42). 
This constantly unfinished work of writing, the work of literature, has a threefold significance. 
LanguageÕs origin is the impossible, but this origin is a non-origin, an origin that can never come to 
light or be reduced to the concept. Language cannot name what it lacks (Blanchot, 1995, p.328). The 
writer does not contact this impossibility through their own genius, but rather, Ô[t]he writer only finds 
himself, only realises himself, through his work; before his work exists, not only does he not know 
who he is, but he is nothingÕ (Blanchot, 1995, p.303). One is only a writer when writing, but this is 
not a purely subjective leap into an impersonal field to encounter the impossible. Instead, it is what 
Michel Foucault referred to as a Ôpower of dissimulationÕ, that subjectivity of the writer is given up in 
the act of writing (Foucault, 1987, p.57). The writer is compelled to work by the act of writing itself, 
which has always already begun due to languages character as an impersonal field within which the 
writer exists: Ôone writes only if one reaches that instant which nevertheless one can only approach in 
the space opened by the movement of writing. To write, one has to write alreadyÕ (Blanchot, 1989, 
p.176). Lastly, this is not a purely negative or pejorative encounter with an origin that is irreducible to 
representation in language. Instead, Blanchot asks the question: Ôhow does rebeginning Ð the non-
origin of all that begins Ð found a beginning?Õ (Blanchot, 1993a, p.249). His answer is that language 
that touches or speaks of this impossible origin is ÔpropheticÕ, not in the sense of proscribing a future, 
but rather in testifying to a future that is irreducible to the current conditions of the possible. This 
Ôforces whoever is listening to tear himself away from his own present in order to come to himself as 
someone who is not yetÕ (Blanchot, 2000, pp.14Ð15). What Blanchot testifies to is that in literature, 
writing, and speech there exists a dual tendency. The creation of a world of communication from 
negation, which itself rests upon the power of the impossible to suspend these relations, pointing 
towards something utterly inconceivable. 
 
BlanchotÕs Influence on StieglerÕs Philosophy of Technics 
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This marks the significance of the epigraph to Technics and Time which Stiegler takes from The 
Infinite Conversation. We do not know when we are at a turning point, precisely because we cannot 
reduce to a single concept the moment at which certainty breaks into this impersonal and impossible 
negation. Yet, we must begin from somewhere. This moment is experienced from within a particular 
field, rather than as a pure experience of the origin of language. For Blanchot, this impossibility of 
experience of negation is the origin of the work (be this literature, poetry or art), but can only be 
experienced through the beginning the production of the work itself (Blanchot, 1989, p.171). StieglerÕs 
emphasis on this point through the use of the citation from the Infinite Conversation at the beginning 
of Technics and Time, marks the importance of these two themes for his work. The indetermination 
of a turning point always arises from the determination of particular context, and the process of 
working through that context. The negation of being that is expressed through the work of writing is 
transformed by Stiegler into the very condition of the human being in general, as a lack of essence that 
can only be experienced through technicity, which both forms and transforms human existence. 
The first key influence that Blanchot has on Stiegler is the notion of an origin that must be experienced, 
but cannot be experienced in itself. This is foundational for the concept of the default of origin. 
Humanity is characterised by a lack of essence or characteristics apart from its use of technical objects. 
The human does not exist outside of its technical supports, which means this default must continually 
unfold through the history of technical objects, without exhausting this originary condition. Humanity 
has no essence other than this supplementary or prosthetic being (Stiegler, 1998, pp.172Ð173). This 
concept is introduced in the first volume of Technics and Time, as the aporia through which the origin 
of the human must be thought. HumanityÕs origin is aporetic because we can only think it from the 
perspective of a technically structured context. This historical perspective prevents the reduction of 
the origin to a particular temporal moment, as it is always understood from within a technical, 
impersonal field. The default is that which must be experienced, through technics, but can never be 
reduced to experience.
iv
 Stiegler makes references to Blanchot to conceive of this origin as something 
that must be experienced yet cannot be encapsulated. In The Space of Literature, Blanchot refers to 
the origin of experience as Ôfrightfully ancient, lost in the night of time. It is the origin which always 
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precedes us and is always given before us, for it is the approach of what allows us to departÕ (Blanchot, 
1989, p.229). For Stiegler, the absence of essence in the technical condition leads to the consideration 
of this origin: Ô[t]he question is the origin, the principle, the most ancient, "the frightfully ancient," 
Blanchot would sayÕ (Stiegler, 1998, p.108).
v
 Elsewhere, Stiegler refers to this frightfully ancient 
condition of the origin as the Ôabsolute past, towards that which accumulated memory sends usÕ 
(Stiegler, 2009b, p.68). All accumulated memory, as technics, is that through which the origin is 
experienced, not as the origin, but as its constant putting to work in technical objects. Technics 
structures human existence, while constantly pointing towards the impossibility of reducing this 
existence to any final form. 
It is worth noting here the specificity of what Stiegler means when he refers to technics. He does not 
simply regard it as technology, but rather something fundamental about human existence that makes 
technology possible. It is foundational for human experience: Ô[a]ll human action has something to do 
with tekhnēÕ (Stiegler, 1998, p.94). Technics refers to the gestures and tools which form human 
experience. Crucially, these techniques are forms of memory. In addition to biological memory 
(genetic), and the memory of the individual subject (epigenetic), technics forms a third form of 
memory which Stiegler terms epiphylogenetic. This is a form of exteriorised memory, which enables 
the individual to pass on its experience beyond death to other individuals. This does not mean that the 
interior functions of psychic individual are merely externalised in technical objects; interior and 
exterior co-constitute each other in Ôan originary complex in which the two terms, far from being 
opposed, compose with one anotherÕ (Stiegler, 1998, p.152). Technical memory is the very condition 
of the human, as an impersonal field of memories in which individuals are produced. Forming human 
capacities, technics refer to the various forms of memory, gesture and techniques which form the 
envelope in which the human is formed across time. We cannot reduce this relationship to a single 
moment of origin because we conceive of this origin from within this complex, opening up this 
impersonal field to its transformation by participation within it. 
BlanchotÕs image of the writer being written by the act of writing takes on a particular significance for 
Stiegler here. The work creates the writer, there is no writer without the work: Ô[t]he writer only finds 
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himself, only realizes himself, through his work; before his work exists, not only does he not know 
who he is, but he is nothingÕ (Blanchot, 1995, p.303). For Stiegler the human is nothing outside of its 
immersion within a particular technical system. In a passage where Stiegler comments extensively on 
the above citation from Blanchot, we find that Ô[w]hat is true of the person who writes is true of 
humanity in general qua an organism that invents and produces. This question of writing is nothing 
but a radicalization of that of the memory of the humanÕ (Stiegler, 1998, pp.264Ð265). Technics, as an 
extension of writing, is the work which humanity participates in, producing itself in an ongoing process 
of anthropogenesis. For Blanchot, writing is connected to work and to history in a constant process of 
transformation: 
if we see work as the force of history, the force that transforms man while it transforms the 
worldÉwhat is a writer doing when he writes? Everything a man does when he works, but 
to an outstanding degree. The writer, too, produces something Ð a work in the highest sense 
of the word....[w]hen he writes, his starting point is a certain state of language, a certain 
form of culture, certain books, and also certain objective elements Ð ink, paper, printing 
presses (Blanchot, 1995, pp.313Ð314). 
Participating in the work of writing does not merely manipulate the slope of language that tends 
towards communication, pointing it towards negation. More importantly, it uses this negation to 
transform the system of language itself. The conclusion Stiegler draws from this passage is that Ô[t]o 
work is to forget the self, to let one's other be-but an other who is not a self, nor one's own, but quite 
otherÉ.This other is at the heart of the idiomÕ (Stiegler, 1998, p.265). By participating in the system 
of technical traces formed of the memory of others, one transforms this system, as it has no ÔneutralÕ 
version by which one can come to know it. Not only does the writer lose themselves in language in 
the act of writing, all human action is predicated upon the double sense of technics, and that immersing 
oneself in this work opens up the impossible. 
Writing is considered as one particular technique by Stiegler, rather than a general term through which 
to understand the process of differentiation. It is one, historical form in which the default of origin is 
expressed in technics. The impersonal field which Blanchot attributes to language and the form of 
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work that writing represents are re-articulated in a process of historical differentiation. The impersonal 
is transformed according to the particular technical objects that constitute it. What Stiegler argues, 
beyond Blanchot, is that the impersonal is a question of technics rather than merely writing and 
language. Stiegler refers to a passage in BlanchotÕs essay ÔThe Beast of LascauxÕ, from which this 
interpretation can be understood clearly: 
the impersonal knowledge of the bookÉdoes not ask to be guaranteed by the thought of 
any one person, since this is never true and can never constitute itself as truth only a world 
inhabited by all and by virtue of such a world. Any such body of knowledge is bound to the 




We have seen one element presented here already, that the impersonal knowledge of the impossible 
only arises through language. But Stiegler emphasizes BlanchotÕs reference to technology: 
ÔimpersonalizationÉbelongs to a history of the gaze in which the book constitutes a specific 
ÒstageÓÉ[a]n impersonal knowledge, an authority without an author, inheres in writing as technicsÕ  
(Stiegler, 2009a, p.132). Technics structures the existence of human groups, constituting the forms 
that the impersonal field takes. One might argue that BlanchotÕs editing of instances of the term 
ÔspeechÕ to ÔwritingÕ in the republication of his older texts in collected form around the 1970Õs, in what 
Derrida identifies as general recognition of the logocentric problems of speech, is continued by 
StieglerÕs further translation of writing to technics (Derrida, 1998, pp.61-2).
vii
 Where Blanchot refers 
to writing and language as founded on negation, Stiegler refers to all forms of human technicity as 
containing the impossible default of origin within it. Taking on this frightful origin and making it the 
condition of technics as a pre-individual, impersonal field means that the process of human history 
Ômust be as interminable as the future is improbableÕ (Stiegler, 2009a, p.132). 
 
The Politics of the Impossible 
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The consequence of this reading of Blanchot is that there is no human outside of the work as a body 
of impersonal memory; there is no humanity outside of technics. By transposing his theory of literature 
onto technicity Stiegler claims that it concerns the human as a form of work. This is central to 
StieglerÕs reading of Blanchot, but is found buried in a note in volume two of Technics and Time. Here 
Stiegler states that he is concerned with: 
the question of the human qua invention, or, as Blanchot says, of (the) work. The first 
humanÕs tool is already and essentially memory: the memory of human gestures Ð 
bequeathed to others beyond any individual life. Thus, to go beyond a single life (animal 
memory) is to enter into death (Stiegler, 2011a, p.256 n.46). 
The impossibility of possibility that the anticipation of death signifies in Blanchot is experienced only 
from within a particular technical system. Anticipation of death is the source of technics, as memory 
supports that transmit memory beyond the death of the individual subject, but technics is also the 
condition of the anticipation of death, as the determined field through which the experience of the 
indeterminate is experienced. This is established primarily through a reading of Heidegger (Stiegler, 
1998, pp.239Ð278), but reaches full significance in the consideration of StieglerÕs use of Blanchot. 
The technical invention of the human is structured around the impossibility of closure, which arises 
from the question of the origin as the perpetual experience of the impossibility of finality within human 
life. The default of origin is the question of a past that is irreducible to any empirically verifiable event, 
an origin that must be repeated within a technical structure for it to be thinkable. It is this concept, 
propped up by reference to Blanchot, that is present across StieglerÕs work, from the first volume of 
Technics and Time (Stiegler, 1998, p.108) to Automatic Society (Stiegler, 2016, p.115). Whereas for 
Blanchot it is the Ôliterary space that alone enables this encounter, the transitional space of reading and 
writingÕ, for Stiegler this is transformed into a technical space, of which it impossible to finally locate 
an origin (Stiegler, 2012a, p.71). 
Consequently, this displacement of the origin via the impersonal structure of technics means the 
impossible must always occur through the technical. Technics structures human existence by situating 
humans within technical systems, but these organisations harbour the impossible and the incalculable 
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within them. Determination is the condition of indetermination; it is only by way of the passage 
through the impersonal technical milieu that structures our existence that it is possible to create 
something new, placing the issue of reproducibility and technicization as primary (Stiegler, 1998, 
p.219; Derrida & Stiegler, 2002, p.89). Human existence is characterised by the relationships formed 
by the passing on of externalised and impersonal knowledges, and how they are transformed in the 
process. (Stiegler, 2014c, p.99, 2015b, p.216). Transmission of experience demands a dialogical and 
never exact repetition as it cannot be reduced to a neutral substratum. This refuses both the solution 
of the problem of the origin, and the finality of concepts or particular modes of existence.  
It is this constant re-interpretation of how the origin is put into existence in technical supports that 
Stiegler turns to in his conceptions of politics. This is reliant upon his more general understanding of 
technics as a pharmakon. Drawing on PlatoÕs Phaedrus and DerridaÕs reading of this in ÔPlatoÕs 
PharmacyÕ (Derrida, 1981), Stiegler conceives of technicity as both a poison and a cure. In StieglerÕs 
reading, for Plato, via Socrates, writing is designated as merely an aid to memory, rather than a form 
of memory itself, and as such raises the question of its distinction from philosophical thought proper 
in order to prevent it weakening the capacity for philosophy (Stiegler, 2013a, p.25; Plato, 1997, p.551 
274e-275a). In DerridaÕs deconstruction of this argument, by tracing the polyvalence of the term 
ÔpharmakonÕ throughout the dialogue (a single term for cure, drug, and potion), he argues that writing 
is both the condition of memory and also that which can weaken it. Stiegler develops DerridaÕs 
argument from one regarding the place of writing as Ôarche-writingÕ, or the condition of differentiation 
that underpins all logical systematicity, to a logic of differentiation that can only be experienced 
through specific technical objects. Technics is curative in that it can engender autonomy through the 
transformation of a shared technical system, and forms the basis of the creation of practices and 
institutions which foster critical engagement. Despite their ability to form critical rationality, as 
pharmaka, technical objects can externalise social practice sand individual capacities without the 
opportunity for critical re-interiorisation and transformation (Stiegler, 2013a, pp.116Ð117). The 
pharmakon is that which mediates the relationship to the default, in that it provides the opportunity 
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for the singularisation of the technical, impersonal field, while also containing a tendency towards 
preventing this process.  
The slant that the reading of Blanchot adds to this understanding of the pharmakon is that its two 
tendencies correspond to the two slopes of language, situating a positive and negative tendency within 
each. The slope that tends towards communication is pharmacologically curative in that technics forms 
a world within which dialogical, social interaction can take place (Stiegler, 2013a, p.20). Equally, this 
slope can induce a levelling process by which externalised forms of memory are not re-internalised, 
reducing the activities of the individual to communication without singularisation and transformation 
(Stiegler, 2013a, p.53). The slope that tends towards the impossible can be pharmacologically positive, 
in that it dis-connects and disindividuates a particular technical system, providing a perspective from 
which to transform it. Equally, this disindividuation can engender an impossibility to create new social 
circuits from these technical contexts, engendering a form of diachronisation without return. The 
challenge of the impossible that underpins the technical, is to navigate these pharmacological 
tendencies in order to induce process of dis-individuation and re-individuation, a process of work 
within which all are potentially included (Barker, 2013). 
 
The impossible plays a central role in StieglerÕs work, particularly in Automatic Society, because it 
allows him to conceive of a way in which the tendency towards transformation created by the default 
of origin can be differentiated by plurality of technical systems and pharmacological problems. This 
focus on the relationship between specific pharmacological objects and their relation to the impossible 
allows a distinction to be made between StieglerÕs use of the impossible and the improbable. He is 
concerned with moments of improbability that are underpinned by the impossible, rather than a 
theorisation of the impossible itself. Stiegler initially refers to the improbable as a law of 
indetermination insofar as it underpins all fact: Ôthere can always be an exceptionÉto the majority of 
facts, even to the vast majority of facts, that is, to virtually all of them, an exception that invalidates 
them in lawÉ.This is whatÉwe will call, alongside Yves Bonnefoy and Maurice Blanchot, the 
improbableÕ (Stiegler, 2016, pp.2Ð3). StieglerÕs reference to Bonnefoy here is with regards to 
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BlanchotÕs own discussion of the improbable in light of his poetry (Blanchot, 1993a, pp.41Ð43). This 
discussion of Bonnefoy by Blanchot is beyond our purposes here, but we can understand StieglerÕs 
use of the improbable without this detail. Its importance is that Stiegler is concerned with how any 
technically supported system of fact relies upon the indetermination of the consistencies it supports. 
Any determined technical system is the condition of the indeterminacy of law, and can be re-
interpreted and transformed through work. This duality between fact and law is used by Stiegler to 
argue that it is only law, as a fictional projection from a particular state of fact, that maintains the unity 
of any political project. 
What is significant in this first mention of the improbable with reference to Blanchot is the absence of 
the impossible, whereas this appears later on in a crucial passage of Automatic Society. Stiegler 
introduces both the impossible and the improbable to explain how what he calls algorithmic 
governmentality attempts to eliminate the impossible conditions of probability that Blanchot sees as 
beyond calculation.
viii
 This form of governance is characterised by the use of automated technologies 
to pre-empt and calculate all aspects of life, adapting markets and products in order to pre-empt, and 
thus render predictable, human behaviour. StieglerÕs critique is that:  
the digital technology of power appears to be invincible, because the power of the 
algorithmic systems seems to be literally and structurally imperturbable Ð§ imperturbable 
by the improbable, which must be understood in a sense that does not simply refer to what 
mathematical calculation and modelling cannot prove, that is, certify beyond what would 
be merely probable, but in the sense of what always escapes any calculation, any probability 
and demonstration (Stiegler, 2016, pp.115-16).  
Improbability is mobilised in a critique of technologies that disavow the structural role that the 
impossible plays in human life. Hence, Ôalgorithmic governmentality disintegrates in advance any 
intermittence, and therefore liquidates the impossible (unpredictable and unanticipatable) possibility 
of the improbableÕ (Stiegler, 2016, p.116). This section has a wider consequence for our reading of 
StieglerÕs work in the context of Blanchot, in that it reveals that Stiegler is more concerned with the 
improbable than the impossible. Improbability arises for Stiegler because the default that underpins 
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the technical milieu we exist in renders it unperceivable, necessary, and contingent all at the same 
time. Improbability refers to the intermittent moments where the impossibility at the heart of technics, 
represented by the default of origin, is revealed. For Blanchot Ôimpossibility is nothing other than the 
mark of what we so readily call experience, for there is experience in the strict sense only where 
something radically other is in playÕ (Blanchot, 1993a, p.46). StieglerÕs shift towards the improbable 
is a result of his claim that we only experience impossibility through a particular technical system. 
Consequently, it would be accurate to say that Stiegler is more explicitly concerned with a politics of 
the improbable, but this is more productively rendered as a politics of the impossible to emphasise the 
influence Blanchot has on making the former position thinkable. That is, a politics of the impossible 
focuses on the specific practices of the improbable by which probability and impossibility meet. 
StieglerÕs focus on the improbable directs our attention to how he taps into a latent anthropological 
tendency within Blanchot. This is particularly evident with regards to the sacred. For Stiegler, the 
impossible only arises from concrete, determined technical practices of the improbable, which the 
indeterminate suspends and transforms through participation. As Kevin Hart has argued, this power 
derives from BlanchotÕs transformation of the divine into the sacred as the impossible. One must Ôcall 
the sacred a condition of impossibility: it interrupts any attempt to freeze the present and render it 
permanentÕ (Hart, 2004, p.100).  In the context of HlderlinÕs poetry, Blanchot writes of the sacred 
that it concerns the Ô[i]mpossible, the reconciliation of the Sacred with speech demanded that the poet's 
existence come nearest to nonexistenceÕ (Blanchot, 1995, p.131). For Stiegler, this irreconcilability of 
the sacred with present speech is only possible through the support of the sacred through ritual. The 
sacred exists because it arises from a technically supported pre-individual fund of language, and that 
the concepts which organize this language are subject to the law of the impossible. In Christianity, for 
example, Ôsuch practicesÉaffirm that it is only in this world, and through this way of living, that it is 
possible to confirm, precisely, the eternity of love andÉthe love of GodÕ (Stiegler, 2013b, p.111). 
While his reference to Christianity on this point has led some commentators to interpret StieglerÕs 
politics in terms of Christian liturgy (Du Toit & Loubser, 2016; Roussow, 2016), he should be seen to 
be making a more general point about the indetermination of belief and its reliance upon techniques. 
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The sacred refers, for Stiegler, to the practices which support the consistence of ideas beyond purely 
religious practice. It is these sacred objects that are consistencies, that direct communication, and are 
always dialogical and irreducible to presence. This emphasis on supports pushes Stiegler towards a 
stronger consideration of the improbable, which is incorporated within a system of possibility, rather 
than the impossible itself. 
 
As such, the connection of the sacred back to ritual demonstrates that in StieglerÕs use of Blanchot it 
is only through particular practices of ÔwritingÕ, or technics, that communication and its transformation 
can be established. Dialogical communication occurs around particular ideal objects or consistencies, 
which can never be reduced to a final understanding, but still require a synchronic milieu to occur 
within (Stiegler, 2010b, p.5). Ritual support of the sacred thus derives from processes of trans-
individuation, and mark the moments where consistence is transformed; moments of improbability 
that rely on a constitutive impossibility  (Stiegler, 2015c, p.72).
ix
 Rather than focusing on the 
impossible as the sacred, StieglerÕs concern is with the different ways in which consistencies are 
cultivated, and therefore accounting for how this impossible basis of communication is supported in 
varying societies, groups and organisations (Stiegler, 2010c, p.180, 2012b, p.3). All ideas and concepts 
are supported by these processes of collective existence, Ôspanning the life of a society, inscribing 
"cosmic rhythms" in it through symbolic ritualsÕ (Stiegler, 2011a, p.216). There is no society, no 
filiation without the of adoption of these shared consistences, but equally this cannot be considered as 
a homogenization, as the impossible is what creates the Ôlink between synchronization and exception 
relative to the We, the diachronization and exception of the IÕ (Stiegler, 2011a, p.100). The impossible 
is the very condition of shared communication, as in Blanchot, but also that which mobilises it. The 
significance of this anthropology of the impossible is its pharmacological extension. This charts the 
way in which the approach towards the impossible represented by the sacred can be reduced to dogma 
which synchronises without criticism, and dis-individuates without re-connection with social 
existence. The pharmacological character of technics prevents the possibility of upholding the 
impossible within the determined. The determined and the undetermined are combined in a critique of 
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the pharmakon: only pharmacologically curative practices make space for the impossible. Or in other 
words, the power to disautomate the automatic, synchronic practices that constitute any coupling 
between the human and the technical (Stiegler, 2016, pp.69Ð72). It is this focus on the milieu of 
specific practices that directs StieglerÕs attention to the improbable over the impossible. 
 
The specific, anthropological context and practice in question in Automatic Society is the rise of 
automation in the Western world, and its consequences for the notions of work, employment and 
culture. As noted above, Stiegler argues that the rise of automated technologies and the prediction of 
social behaviours through algorithms reduces life to a series of calculable outcomes. This eradicates 
the space for the impossible, precisely because it cannot be reduced to any logical system or set of 
possibilities. It is important to note that Stiegler is not opposing calculation and the impossible, for 
indetermination is only possible from within a particular, technically determined impersonal field of 
possibility. Instead, he is arguing pharmacologically: there are synchronic practices that make space 
for the impossibility of the diachronic, and there are synchronic practices which eradicate this space, 
and forms of diachrony that do not allow the possibility for re-socialisation in new forms of synchrony. 
This possibility is not an aberration, but arises through the default of origin itself: Ô[t]he default is the 
pharmakon, which is the origin of the relation (which Blanchot ultimately tried to think in terms of 
the relation without relation), as this impossible and improbable possibility that is the originary default 
of originÕ (Stiegler, 2016, p.119). What is a question of the status of writing and literature in Blanchot, 
becomes tied to a general understanding of indeterminacy within technics, mobilised within a critique 
of calculation in the contemporary. 
 
This is most clear in StieglerÕs distinction between work and employment. Work, in the manner that 
Blanchot understands it, is a practice of the improbable which the intermittently puts the impossible 
into movement. Participation in work is not merely the exchange of time and labour for remuneration, 
but an encounter with indetermination, reached through not just writing, but the engagement with 
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techniques more broadly understood. The notion of work as labour is what Stiegler refers to as 
employment, which can be reduced to the calculation of inputs, outputs and profits which are the 
domain of the determined and the probable. The distinction between work and employment lies in the 
dissolution of certainty that work implies, in the possibility for the critique and construction of new 
forms of knowledge through the engagement with the pre-individual field of technicity. In this regard, 
Stiegler actively tries to rethinking the concept of critique beyond the frame of metaphysics, taking it 
as a form of invention that draws on and transforms existing materials (Stiegler, 2010a, p.15). Work, 
as this practice of the impossible, is in some form the condition of all social existence (Stiegler, 2016, 
pp.173Ð177). StieglerÕs concern is that today the dual tendency towards increasing automation of 
employment, which diminishes work, and the replacement of employment by automation, requires the 
re-thinking of economics in order to put contribution, rather than profit, at its centre. This notion of 
contribution, as the transformation of synchronic, pre-individual and impersonal systems of 
knowledge, is indebted to BlanchotÕs notion of the impossible. This debt is articulated through a focus 
upon the specific practices of the improbable in which the impossible comes to light. 
 
Impossibility, Resistance, and Invention 
It is not our aim to consider this notion of economics in full, but it serves as an example of how 
StieglerÕs use of Blanchot underpins his more general political project.
x
 This is one that attempts to 
reconcile two apparently contradictory aims. On the one hand, the need to make space for the 
indeterminacy of the default of origin, in order to allow the construction of a future as the establishment 
of a state of law from a particular state of fact. On the other, that the very construction of this space 
requires a broad ranging and overarching approach to politics, which is industrial in scope. It is this 
tension that makes clear the shift in focus from impossibility to improbability, for Stiegler fights the 
romantic tendency to associate the impossible itself with any political goal. In conclusion, we can note 
three ramifications of the above discussion of StieglerÕs adoption of BlanchotÕs work. The first is 
philosophical, and regards a renewed interest in the notion of the negative. This arises from the 
extension of the role of the negative in BlanchotÕs underpinning of the dialogical nature of consistence. 
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The second is that StieglerÕs use of the impossible creates a gap between BlanchotÕs own resistance 
centred politics and StieglerÕs focus on invention, the latter being more closely related to the 
improbable. The third concerns this relationship between improbability and impossibility as it applies 
to StieglerÕs response to post-structuralism, which implicates BlanchotÕs notion of impossibility within 
systemic forms of political action. 
 
First, while Stiegler states that in his thought reason is non-dialectical, and that we must distinguish 
unification (as a movement or process where tendencies are composed) from dialectical totalisation, 
there is a role for the negative to play in the influence that Blanchot has on Stiegler (Stiegler, 2015b, 
p.101). This can be noted in that Stiegler sees the significance of Hegelian dialectics in its positing of 
the process of spirit and of individuation as a process by which the subject finds its constitution in a 
movement outside itself (Stiegler, 2015b, pp.106Ð107). The subject can only become itself by 
internalising the system of technical objects, but without exhausting the possibilities of this impersonal 
field. By interpreting the dialectic as a process that is un-totalisable, or un-sublatable, Stiegler sees in 
dialectical reasoning the beginnings of a pharmacological negativity (Stiegler, 2015b, p.129). If 
StieglerÕs understanding of technicity is derived from Blanchot, then there is a role for the negative in 
the pharmakon, not as dialectical necessity, but as the process by which the subject is ineluctably put 
outside of itself with which it must come to terms with. It is this negativity that is the basis of the 
impossible collapse of certainty into something new, or the pharmacological eradication of capacities. 
Negation is not dialectical, but either inventive or destructive of invention. StieglerÕs reading of 
Blanchot signals a reconsideration of the negative beyond its rejection more broadly by the milieu of 
20
th
 century French thought that Stiegler emerges from, by reconsidering the impossibility that 
mobilises it yet cannot be reduced to it (Noys, 2010). 
Second, Stiegler conjoins the more abstract notions of undecidability and indetermination with a focus 
on the anthropological determinants of these processes. This allows us to return to the difference 
between the politics of Blanchot and Stiegler. The latterÕs contextualisation of the impossible within 
the improbable requires focusing on how the relationship between humanity and technics produces 
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different spaces for practices of indetermination, and how these practices fit into a particular 
pharmacological context. This leads to Stiegler to advocate a politics of invention, centred on 
developing new social practices, technologies and policies to facilitate the practice of the improbable. 
Where Stiegler grounds his political thought in the impossible, the later Blanchot makes the impossible 
and its resistance to the present the goal to be pursued. Writing of the events of May 1968 Blanchot 
refers to the barricading of the Sorbonne as Ôan ÔÔexemplary actÕÕÕ precisely because it made space for 
action that Ôgoes beyond itself while coming from very far away, superseding itself and in an instant, 
with a shattering suddenness, exploding its limitsÕ (Blanchot, 1993b, pp.98Ð99). In other words, a 
form of action not constrained by the law of the possible. In contrast to this politics of resistance, 
StieglerÕs politics seeks to invent practices of the improbable from within structural limits. Politics 
should not affirm indeterminacy, singularity, or the impossible in themselves, but must be tied the 
project of both critiquing and producing synchronic institutions and practices which make room for 
impossibility through their practice of the improbable.  
Third, StieglerÕs reading of Blanchot forms part of his critical relationship with the post-structuralist 
tradition that he both utilises and breaks from (Stiegler, 2013c, 2013d). For post-structuralism, 
Blanchot plays a significant role in consolidating the importance of singularity and dissimulation over 
large scale systematic politics (Deleuze, 2006, p.8).
xi
 Instead, for Stiegler the impossible is a condition 
of politics but it is not a good in itself. This is precisely why he advocates invention over resistance 
for focusing on the impossible alone leads to a Ôrenunciation of inventionÕ (Stiegler, 2016, p.177). 
Careful consideration of how the impossible arises from the specific pharmacological tendencies of 
the technical is required in order to ensure the descent into the impersonal can be tethered to 
pharmacologically curative social practices. Considering the role of the impossible within practices of 
the improbable prevents these states of fact from being naturalised, and reveals the contingency of 
human existence at the same time as providing a way of transforming it through an engagement with, 
rather than a rejection of, technics. Political thought must attempt to subsist within this tension between 
the negation inherent in the impossible, and the systematicity needed to cultivate it. It is the focus on 
this tension that shifts Stiegler from the impossible to the improbable. 
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In the context of European and Anglo-American politics this requires taking into account the role that 
the culture industry, automation, and the transformation of employment has upon the possibility for 
the practice of the impossible that Stiegler identifies with the improbable. Systemic transformation of 
political, educational, and social structures is required in order to allow the development of practices 
of the improbable that harbour the impossible. The time for the impossible must be produced to 
guarantee any viable future political project. The agent of this politics of the impossible, in contrast to 
the resisting subject that post-structuralism develops from Blanchot, is a subject that partakes in 
inventing structures that condition practices of the impossible. In StieglerÕs work, this takes place 
through diverse programs that include supporting a form of Universal Basic Income and founding a 
doctoral school to promote contributory research. Crucially, this engagement takes place in a dialogue 
with, rather than a rejection of, existing structures of political power in France. While it is a question 
worth posing, what is at stake here is not whether this is constitutes a reformism (Bunyard, 2012). 
Rather, it is that StieglerÕs attempt to break with post-structuralism occurs within his reading of 
Blanchot, and his codification of the exigency of the impossible within structures of the improbable. 
For Stiegler, the technical condition demands that the agent of the future is no longer to be found in 
the fragmentary and unforeseen resistances of the present, but in the deliberate invention of structures 
that contain this impossibility within practices of the improbable.
i
 The translation in the first volume of Technics and Time differs slightly to the translated version of 
BlanchotÕs The Infinite Conversation, which reads: 
Will you allow as a certainty that we are at a turning point?  
- If it is a certainty it is not a turning. The fact of our belonging to this moment at which a 
change of epoch, if there is one, is being accomplished also takes hold of the certain 
knowledge that would want to determine it, making both certainty and uncertainty 
inappropriate. Never are we less able to get around ourselves than at such a moment, and 
the discrete force of the turning point lies first in this (Blanchot, 1993a, p.264). 
ii
 Exceptions include the anonymously authored pamphlets distributed during May 1968, and the later 
work The Unavowable Community (Blanchot, 1988).  
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iii
 See: http://arsindustrialis.org. 
iv
 The English translation of Technics and Time renders StiglerÕs use of the term dfaut as default in 
order to capture the polyvalent sense he attributes it with (lack, defect, mistake, failure), and to 
distinguish it from the use of the concept of lack in 20
th
 century French thought. See the translators 
note in The Fault of Epimetheus (Stiegler, 1998, p.280 n.12).  
v
 Translation modified. 
vi
 Emphasis added. 
vii
 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this reference to my attention. 
viii
 Stiegler takes this term from the work of Thomas Berns and Antoinette Rouvroy (2013). 
ix
  While there is not room to expand on this here, StieglerÕs understanding of the value of the sacred 
also draws upon George BatailleÕs notions of expenditure and general economy (Stiegler, 2016, p.21). 
x
 See For a New Critique of Political Economy for StieglerÕs most extensive engagement with 
economics (2010a). 
xi
 It within this disagreement with post-structuralism that Stiegler develops his understanding of 
ideology (Turner, 2017).	
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